This study examines how the Chinese government (People’s Republic of China) maintains extraterritorial control over Tibetans in Taiwan through digital platforms, specifically WeChat. Drawing on the theoretical lens of the dispositif (apparatus) developed by Michel Foucault and further elaborated upon by Gilles Deleuze and Giorgio Agamben, this study argues that WeChat cannot be treated as neutral technology. Instead, it functioned as a sociopolitical apparatus deeply embedded in the strategic forces of the Chinese state. Through three empirical cases of Tibetans in Taiwan, this study finds that WeChat not only helps the Chinese state integrate the Tibetan diaspora within its sphere of influence but also transforms them into subjects through an integrated network system that includes surveillance, promotion of social relations, leveraging kinship ties, and continuous modulation. The prevalence of self-censorship among Tibetans in Taiwan across the digital ecosystem, observable beyond WeChat to platforms such as LINE, demonstrates how WeChat as a dispositif expands Chinese state power transnationally, transcending conventional spatial and temporal boundaries through ambient and diffuse governance mechanisms.

Keywords: dispositif, WeChat, digital authoritarianism, China, Tibetans in Taiwan

Introduction

When I arrived in Taiwan in September 2019 and joined a local Tibetan community LINE group, I began sharing news and commentary related to Tibet, including reports on human rights violations that the Chinese government classifies as “politically sensitive.” Shortly thereafter, a close friend cautioned me against posting such content in the group, warning that “people are watching you.” At that time, the warning appeared vague and even exaggerated. Five years later, it was proven prescient. Of the nearly 200 members in the group, only two or three individuals regularly shared Tibet-related information, while the overwhelming majority remained silent observers. This pervasive silence is striking, particularly given that LINE, unlike WeChat, is not subject to direct Chinese state control and operates in Taiwan’s democratic digital environment. However, the absence of voices in this space cannot be explained by examining LINE alone. Rather, its roots lie in experiences shaped through WeChat, a platform on which most Tibetans rely to communicate with family and friends in Tibet. Within WeChat’s ecosystem, characterized by state surveillance, censorship, extensive data extraction, and opaque enforcement mechanisms, Tibetans encounter a contemporary regime of power that extends beyond China’s territorial borders (Luqiu & Kang, 2021; Plantin & de Seta, 2019; Wang & Gu, 2016). It is within this environment that users learn about the risks associated with visibility, speech, and dissent. Interestingly, these lessons are not confined to WeChat itself. Instead, they migrate across platforms and outside particular platform spaces, shaping both discursive and non-discursive practices, even in spaces ostensibly free from Chinese state control, including LINE. 

To understand how WeChat transformed Tibetans in Taiwan into subjects of Chinese state control, this study employed the theoretical lens of dispositif. Rather than simply treating WeChat as a neutral communication tool, the analysis reveals it as an apparatus that works with networks of social elements, producing a regime of control whose power operates through the everyday life of the user. In short, this study reveals that WeChat is not merely a messaging app or a single tool; it is part of a broader dispositif, an ensemble of technologies, state practices, social norms, and regulatory mechanisms that together shape Tibetan users’ behavior, speech, and imagination in the diaspora.

The analysis draws on qualitative interviews conducted with Tibetans living in Taiwan between May and July 2025, complemented by participatory observations in online communication spaces. The interviews were conducted both in person and online. Considering the surveillance and repercussions, all interviewees were anonymized, and identifying details were altered or omitted in accordance with ethical research practices. By centering on these lived experiences, this article demonstrates how digital infrastructure enables the transnational extension of authoritarianism, revealing how control is exercised not only through direct coercion but also through the subtle normalization of silence and self-censorship within diasporic life.

WeChat as Dispositif (Apparatus): A Theoretical Framework

To understand WeChat beyond messaging apps, this study draws on the theory of dispositif. Dispositif, a French term commonly translated as “apparatus”, emerged prominently from Michel Foucault’s analysis of power, knowledge, and governmentality (Agamben, 2009, p. 1). He conceptualizes dispositif not as a single institution, law, or technology but as an invisible web or network that connects different elements of society. These different elements include both discursive and non-discursive components, including discourses, philosophies, institutions, legal measures, administrative practices, technologies, norms, and forms of knowledge, which work together to manage behavior and maintain power (O’Farrell, 2019). He further argues that these elements are embedded within relations of power and are oriented toward managing uncertainty, governing populations, and stabilizing the social order (Agamben, 2009, p.2). According to Foucault, dispositif is strategic in nature, meaning that it emerges in response to specific historical moments (Ibid). In this sense, he underlines temporal and spatial limitations. Another crucial characteristic is that dispositif is inseparable from the production of knowledge and subjectivity; it defines both what can be known and the types of subjects who can know it. As demonstrated by Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1975), disciplinary dispositif produces disciplined and docile bodies through the coordination of surveillance, normalisation and institutional practices (Agamben, 2009, p. 3).

Gilles Deleuze extends Foucault’s analysis through his theorization of ‘societies of control’, arguing that with the rise of computational and digital technologies, power increasingly operates beyond enclosed spaces and fixed temporalities, circulating instead continuously through open-ended networks (Deleuze, 1992a). Deleuze conceptualizes dispositif as machines of multiple lines “that make one see and speak” (Deleuze, 1992b). These bundles of intertwined lines, including visibility, utterance, force, subjectivity, and cracking, shape how people see, speak, act, and become subjects of a particular control regime. Deleuze’s characterization of dispositif focuses not merely on capture or fixed prohibition but also on the continuous modulation of subjects.   

While Foucault views dispositif as a network, and Deleuze views it as a continuously moving line, Giorgio Agamben expands the concept of dispositif through biopolitical analysis. He defines a dispositif as “anything that has the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings”, including everyday technologies such as digital platforms and mobile phones (Agamben, 2009, p. 14). In contrast to Foucault and Deleuze, who focus on discipline and modulation of human behavior, Agamben argues that in the modern world, dispositifs no longer create new subjectivities; instead, they strip subjects of meaningful identity, reducing them to what he calls “bare life.” Therefore, Agamben’s view of dispositif focuses on how digital technologies, such as WeChat, suppress basic rights and agency.

WeChat as Dispositif

Tencent, a private company in China, launched WeChat in 2011. Initially launched as a messaging app, it has since evolved into a “quasi-utility” (Li, 2024) and a core digital infrastructure embedded deeply in everyday life, integrating communication, payments, access to services, commercial activity, and information consumption (Plantin & de Seta, 2019). It is one of the world’s largest messaging platforms, with an average user in China spending at least four hours per day on WeChat alone (Mia, 2018). WeChat’s dominant position in China rests on three interrelated mechanisms. First, state protectionism has limited foreign competitors, produced a captive domestic market, and rendered WeChat indispensable for maintaining social ties with individuals under Chinese jurisdiction. Second, strategic alignment between the platform and state, particularly under the Cybersecurity Law (2017), facilitates content regulation, data access, and surveillance (Plantin & de Seta, 2019). Third, WeChat’s technical architecture enables large-scale monitoring through server-side censorship, real-time content scanning, and data analysis (Kenyon, 2020; Luqiu and Kang, 2021). As Human Rights Watch observes,

“WeChat constitutes a ‘complete digital ecosystem’ in which users conduct most aspects of their digital lives within a tightly controlled informational environment, with limited meaningful alternatives” (Human Rights Watch, 2024).

In this context, although WeChat was launched amidst the digital revolution as a social networking application, today it functions beyond this by operating as a total dispositif that not only integrates users with the system but also subjects them to discipline and control through an integrated system of surveillance, censorship, manipulation, promotion of social relations, connectivity, convenience, and knowledge production. Therefore, in Michel Foucault’s sense, it functions as an assemblage by linking users to networks of state and corporate interests in data collection, surveillance, censorship, and algorithmic pre-emption. The power operations of WeChat do not stop within particular spatial and temporal boundaries; instead, they operate through the Deleuzian concept of open networks via continuous monitoring and modulation. Therefore, there are no fixed norms for what can be said or made visible. Essentially, as in Agamben’s apparatus, WeChat also operates in a biopolitical mode that not merely captures and integrates users within its system but also transforms them into compliant or “docile bodies” (Foucault, 1975) by circumscribing their rights and agency.

WeChat and Experiences of Tibetans in Taiwan: Three Different Cases

The size of the Tibetan population in Taiwan is difficult to determine precisely. The Mongol and Tibetan Culture Centre (MTCC) reports that more than 500 Tibetans live in Taiwan as Taiwanese citizens (Pan & Tsering, 2024, p. 284). However, some Tibetans in Taiwan argue that this figure has been exaggerated, noting that many individuals included in this number have already migrated to Western and European countries (conversations with Tibetans in Taiwan). According to these accounts, the number of Tibetans holding Taiwanese citizenship is close to 200–300 (Ibid.). Additionally, there is another group of Tibetan monks and students who temporarily reside in Taiwan. Estimates for this population range from 200 to 600 individuals, with monks constituting the overwhelming majority (Ibid).  Therefore, the total number of Tibetans in Taiwan, both citizens and temporary residents, is estimated to be approximately 600-800 Tibetans in Taiwan.

Tenzin Dhala, a researcher with the Tibet Policy Institute, based in Dharamsala, India, argues that WeChat is the most popular app among Tibetan diaspora in India, with 70 percent of them using WeChat as their primary social networking app, even though WhatsApp is the most popular messaging application in India overall (Dhala, 2019). Like Tibetans in India, WeChat is popular among Tibetans in Taiwan. The popularity of WeChat among Tibetans in Taiwan stems from several factors. Familial and social ties play central roles. Many Tibetans in Taiwan maintain close relationships with family members and friends, and because most foreign applications are banned in China. Therefore, WeChat’s popularity among Tibetans in Taiwan is also shaped more by structural constraints than by individual choice. Second, WeChat offers accessibility in terms of language input and supports the Tibetan, English, and Chinese keyboards. Third, its voice and video call functions, as well as its voice recording features, are especially popular among users with limited literacy. Fourth, WeChat serves as an important source of news and information for various interest groups, including journalists and researchers (Tsering, 2025). Among these factors, familial ties constitute the most significant reason for WeChat’s widespread use (Interviews with Tibetans in Taiwan). 

This study conducted interviews with a few (10) Tibetans in Taiwan to explore their experiences and the dynamics of pervasive and ambient control. It is crucial to note that all the details shared concerning their personal identities have been changed and anonymized for security and ethical obligations. The experiences shared by these Tibetans are categorized into three different cases based on the uniqueness of the experience. Due to the limited number of participants, there is a limitation in the generalization of findings shared by this study.

Case 1: Tenzin: A blacklisted user

Tenzin, a Tibetan born in Tibet, flew to India as a refugee. After completing his education, he worked for the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), also known as the Tibetan government-in-exile. The Chinese government identifies the CTA as a separatist organization and categorizes individuals associated with it as threats to national stability, frequently placing them on state security blacklists. After relocating to Taiwan several years ago, Tenzin attempted to reconnect with friends and family in Tibet through WeChat. He had previously lost contact with them when India banned WeChat, along with more than 50 other Chinese applications, in 2020, following border tensions between the two countries. When Tenzin eventually managed to reconnect with a close friend in Tibet, their conversation was abruptly terminated after approximately ten minutes. Shortly thereafter, he received a message from his friend requesting that he never contact him. Tenzin later learned that his friend had been interrogated by the police, following a brief exchange. Tenzin explained that this incident was likely linked to his past employment with the CTA and his inclusion in the Chinese government’s blacklist. 

His experience illustrates how WeChat operates as a biopolitical apparatus through real-time surveillance and punishment of users through interrogation and social isolation. As a blacklisted user, Tenzin is effectively compelled to social isolation, as his presence and communication violate both the normative expectations embedded within WeChat and the broader dispositif of the Chinese state.

 Case 2: Lhamo: Manipulation of Families

Lhamo moved to Taiwan several decades ago. Her family members remain in Tibet, and like many individuals with relatives in territories under the control of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), she maintains contact with them through WeChat. One day, Lhamo received a friend request on WeChat and accepted it out of curiosity. The new friend asked her to return to Tibet and promised to provide financial support to start a business upon her return. Lhamo explained that she had been attempting to obtain travel permits to visit her family and home in Tibet for many years, but failed to obtain one. Because she originates from the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), travel restrictions are considerably stricter than in other Tibetan areas under PRC control because of the region’s political sensitivity. The new WeChat friend also claimed to be able to assist with visa arrangements for her to visit her family and home. “The offer of visa assistance and financial assistance seemed too good to be true,” Lhamo recalled. During a subsequent conversation, her brother in Tibet revealed that the local public security bureau called him and asked for Lhamo’s WeChat details. According to her brother, the officers attempted to manipulate him by portraying Lhamo’s living conditions in Taiwan as poor and asserting that they merely wanted to help her. These encounters deeply unsettled Lhamo. She subsequently blocked the new friend in WeChat and has since become far more cautious in her use of WeChat. Although her brother continues to receive occasional visits from the authorities, no major incidents have occurred. Reflecting on the experience, Lhamo stated, “We all are aware of surveillance on WeChat, but I never expected it to be so insidious.”

Lhamo’s case demonstrates how WeChat, as a dispositif, reads and reorganizes social relations, particularly emotional and kinship ties, by transforming them into data points that can be mobilized for governance. Through this process, intimate family relationships become vectors of surveillance and control, revealing the pervasive and deeply embedded nature of digital power through everyday communication.

 Case 3: Self-Censorship as the New Norms

In addition to the two cases discussed above, the vast majority of interviewees reported experiences of a different nature. Unlike Tenzin and Lhamo, these interviewees did not experience direct intimidation, infiltration, or explicit threats resulting from their interactions through WeChat. However, more in-depth conversations revealed that their relatively smooth experiences were not accidental, but rather the outcome of an adaptive strategy widely practiced among WeChat users: the normalization of self-censorship. A frequently repeated phrase across interviews captures this dynamic succinctly: “As long as one does not engage in political activities, you have full freedom, not only access to the app, but also the ability to visit family in Tibet.” For instance, one interviewee said, “I have not experienced any threat through WeChat, but I know that someone is always watching me, therefore, I am very careful in using WeChat and I know that there is no space for any political content”. When I asked what constitutes political content, he mentioned “information related to the 14th Dalai Lama, the Tibetan National Uprising Day, the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) and sometimes mentioning some important religious figures”. These items constitute a commonly understood, though unofficial, and constantly shifting set of prohibited topics. As several interviewees explained, the boundaries of censorship vary across time and contexts. For example, during Kalachakra, a major religious event held in India in 2014, the term Kalachakra itself was reportedly flagged within the system (Tibet Action Institute, 2019). One interviewee summarized their approach by stating, “I do not really engage that much on WeChat except sharing Moments occasionally and making calls with my family. Moreover, we are cautious in what we talk about; it is largely mundane topics like the weather or what we eat.”

These cases demonstrate how WeChat operates as a heterogeneous assemblage of technologies, discourses, practices, and regulatory mechanisms that produce political subjectivity beyond the territorial control of the Chinese state. Rather than relying on overt coercion, this form of governance works through continuous surveillance, data extraction, regulation of kinship ties, and the internalization of disciplinary norms. Eventually, these mechanisms normalize anticipatory and persistent self-censorship among Tibetans in Taiwan, extending state-aligned modes of subject formation across transnational digital and social spaces, including non-Chinese social messaging applications such as LINE.

Conclusion

This study employs the theoretical framework of dispositif, drawing on Foucault, Deleuze, and Agamben, to analyze how WeChat, as a social networking app, integrates and transforms Tibetans in Taiwan, who lack direct territorial and juridical control by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), into new subjects of the PRC. The theoretical framework illustrates WeChat not merely as a social networking app but also as a digital dispositif that produces a regime of control and new subjectivity through assemblages of interconnected lines of data extraction, structuring of social dependencies, censorship, surveillance, and continuous modulation of users’ behavior. As such, WeChat cannot be understood as a neutral technology; rather, it constitutes a dispositif through which governance is embedded in everyday life.

Furthermore, the cases examined in this study reveal that WeChat’s power is not exercised solely through technical censorship or direct repression; instead, it operates through the reconfiguration of social relations, particularly through the manipulation of kinship ties and normalization of uncertainty, fear, and anticipatory compliance. The pervasive self-censorship observed among Tibetans in Taiwan, evident even on alternative platforms such as LINE, illustrates how WeChat produces new forms of subjectivity, subjects who negotiate the dispositif itself, maintaining awareness of surveillance, and making calculated decisions about visibility and utterance while complying with the Chinese state. In this sense, WeChat has transformed Tibetans in Taiwan into new subjects of the Chinese state, who are neither purely dominated nor free. In the Tibetan case, self-censorship in digital platforms across both Chinese and non-Chinese platforms acts as a mode of navigation rather than a complete surrender.

In conclusion, the findings of this study suggest that WeChat exemplifies a broader mode of contemporary dispositif, in which power operates through infrastructural dependency, data extraction, control of affective ties, coercion, and the internalization of state surveillance. The platform illustrates how digital technologies empower authoritarian states to extend their control beyond territorial boundaries, transforming communication infrastructure into instruments of transnational governance that reshape subjectivity through ambient, diffuse, and deeply embedded mechanisms of power.

Funding

This work is part of the NSTC 114-2811-H-A49-502.

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